# Actions Speak Louder Than Words: The Impact of International Organizations on Public Behavior

Adam Cullen

**Abstract** In the wake of COVID-19 and potentially catastrophic climate change, international organizations have recommended that the public alter its behavior in some significant ways. Despite this, international relations literature has focused solely on how International Organizations (IOs) can change the public's views rather than their actions. I rectify this omission by looking at the interaction between the signaling of IOs and three other messengers: domestic elites, the United Nations and federal courts. Drawing on elite cueing and IO legitimacy literature, I theorize that domestic elites and the UN will be effective at altering the public's behavior, while courts will not. To test my hypotheses I administer a randomized survey experiment to approximately 3,000 citizens of 10 UN member states. The survey tests whether citizens are willing to adopt more sustainable methods of transportation based on the recommendation of an environmental IO, with each treatment group receiving statements of support or opposition from the messengers being studied. Finally, I conclude and draw policy implications regarding the most effective ways to get the public to change their behavior.

## Introduction

"Actions speak louder than words" has become a tired cliche, but it is still true in politics. In the United States, we often hear around election time that the only poll that counts is the one that is taken on election day. To put that in simpler terms, it doesn't matter who people say they are going to vote for, only who they cast their vote for when they take action and go to the polls. Recent political events have also made it necessary in the eyes of international organizations for the public to change its behavior rather than just their views. The World Health Organization (WHO) and Center for Disease Control (CDC) were urging the public to adopt public health measures, such as wearing masks, during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. While the pandemic was a once-in-a-generation event, this dynamic is true of many environmental organizations as well. For example, while groups like Greenpeace largely focus their attacks on corporations, they also urge individual restraint on overfishing and deforestation, among other practices.

Why, then, does so little international relations literature focus on people's behavior rather than just their views? What are the most effective signaling tactics to get people to change their behavior? Public opinion of international organizations is one of the

most studied topics in IR literature; there have been countless theories posited on what makes IOs legitimate and how they can boost their standing with audiences (Chapman 2009; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2021; Greenhill 2018; Panke et al. 2022; Tingley and Tomz 2021). However, this breadth of work has not carried over to the logical next step of how people act, rather than just how they think.

Opinion is surely easier to study than behavior because it is easier to measure, and it also takes a lot less effort on all sides to change people's minds than it does to inspire any sort of action. However, recent events have highlighted the importance of studying the latter. The question of whether governments or international organizations can actually affect the public's decision-making has come into sharp focus in recent years since both the start of the COVID-19 pandemic and increased alarm surrounding the catastrophic effects of climate change. Even during the height of the pandemic, many members of the public flouted guidance from groups like the WHO or the CDC. When looking back at the pandemic and other similar issues, it is important to determine why so many members of the public did not follow the guidelines, and what could have been different in the IOs' messaging to better assure compliance.

The growing effects of climate change also necessitate more emphasis on organizations' role in ensuring behavioral compliance on an individual level. Some sustainability measures necessitate as much compliance on an individual level as they do on a state level, or at the very least, could be hampered by large swaths of individual resistance. Take, for example, the issue of sustainable transportation and infrastructure. Obviously, it is mostly the role of the government and private firms to update a nation's infrastructure to a landscape that is green and long-lasting. However, individual citizens also need to take a number of actions for these programs to be as successful as they can be. These include voting for politicians who support such programs or actively changing their own commute methods to ones that are more environmentally friendly. Governments and IOs surely want to change people's minds in favor of their programs, but to be as successful as possible, they need to change people's behavior as well.

Determining when and why people trust an IO's messaging is essential to the discussion of whether an IO's decision-making can actually trickle down to that of the common person. Answering these questions will help us determine in what situations IOs can actively get the public to change their behavior. This aspect of IOs' role has garnered more academic attention since the onset of COVID-19 (Khemani 2020), but the signaling tactics that IOs employ in these scenarios remain largely unexplored. Also unexplored is the interaction between IOs and other groups of political messengers, particularly those on the domestic level. How do people react differently when an organization's advice is supported (or contradicted) by their domestic representatives? Few scholars have addressed this question, either in regard to elected representatives or other actors like judicial institutions.

I attempt to answer these questions by looking at the signaling tactics employed by three different groups: domestic elites, the United Nations, and legal institutions. I theorize that cueing from domestic elites will be the most effective at getting the public

to change their behavior. To test my theory I conduct a randomized survey experiment of roughly 3,000 citizens in 10 randomly selected UN member states stratified by region. The experiment features a scenario in which an international organization has recommended that citizens make an effort to switch to more sustainable methods of transportation, variously supported and opposed by each group being studied. Finally, I draw several policy implications regarding IO signaling tactics and environmental measures.

## Literature Review

International relations literature is filled with theories that seek to argue the ways in which IOs can improve their opinion of themselves and the policies that they seek to promote. Having legitimacy in the eyes of the public is generally thought to be necessary for IOs to remain relevant, grow, and maintain compliance with international law and norms (Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Tallberg and Zurn 2019). Additionally, different messaging tactics have been proposed as ideal for getting the public on an organization's side, including offering policies in the language of specific states' security interests or letting the elites of particular states handle the messaging on the IO's behalf (Chapman 2009; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2020). These authors have produced a wealth of valuable work on IO legitimacy and messaging, but the outcome variables in all their papers are related to the public's views, not their actions.

There are mixed results regarding how much sway an IO has over public opinion on a particular issue. There are numerous works alleging that approval by groups like the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) can dramatically improve public opinion on the use of military force in a particular conflict (Thompson 2006; Maliniak and Tierney 2014; Greenhill 2018). These works broadly argue that IOs can lend prestige and legitimacy to domestic decisions that may otherwise be controversial (Hurd 2002). However, there are an equal number of works that argue that IOs have a constraining effect due to rising populist and anti-globalist sentiments within the global community (Dellmuth et al 2021; Inglehart and Norris 2017; Rodrik 2017). This inconsistency makes it difficult to parse both the most effective messaging tactics an IO can utilize and broadly whether IOs are effective messengers at all.

Along with the inconsistencies of this relationship, few authors have looked at the interaction between an IO and other signalers. Elite cueing is an important topic in addressing this question. Put simply, elite cueing is the idea that members of the public base their opinion on political issues on signaling they receive from political elites. There has been debate over which direction of the relationship is more significant: the views of the audience influencing elites (Inglehart and Norris 2017; Rodrik 2017), elites influencing audiences (Dellmuth and Tallberg 2020; Dur and Schlipphak 2020; Merkley and Stecula 2020; Naoi and Kume 2015; Nelson and Steinberg 2018) or a two-way relationship (Sanders and Toka 2013). Elites can also influence how citizens view IOs, with authors arguing that domestic elites can influence public perception of IOs much more than IOs themselves (Dellmuth and Tallberg 2020). Due to the public's general lack of complex policy knowledge, it is often assumed that elites get

to "frame" the issues for them, casting them in intensely partisan terms even if the audience does not understand them (Dur and Schlipphak 2020; Merkley and Stecula 2020; Naoi and Kume 2015). In particular, partisan elites can make use of in-group and out-group biases to get their constituents onto the side of the issue they are pushing (Bisgaard and Slothuus 2018; Merkley and Stecula 2020). Negative partisanship can make people oppose issues, like measures to address climate change, that, in theory, should be apolitical. It is clear that domestic elites have an impact on the way people think about issues, even when they have little knowledge of the issue or if it contradicts an individual's prior views. However, few have looked at how the messaging of an IO and the messaging of domestic elites on the same issues interact with one another.

None of these works take the next step and ask how this public opinion translates into the citizens' behavior. This would seem to be the logical next question, yet few authors in the literature I have reviewed broach it. When does public opinion of an IO translate into identifiable action? What messaging tactics (or messengers) are most effective in this pursuit? Answers to these relevant questions are lacking within the existing scholarship. If we are to truly understand the effect international organizations have on the public, we need to understand why people behave the way they do, as well as why they think as they do.

## Theory and Hypotheses

I test three different mechanisms that may condition the effect an international organization's decision has on citizen behavior: elite cueing, endorsements from other IOs, and endorsements from judicial institutions. Each are institutions that could reasonably have some effect on how the public thinks about an issue, but has different sources of legitimacy and utilizes different signaling tactics. Domestic elites can speak to the public's partisanship and nationalism, recasting the organization's decision using partisan heuristics that domestic audiences can more easily understand. International organizations, especially large and well-known ones like the United Nations, can portray themselves as having higher importance than individual governments and representing the global consensus on a particular policy. Legal institutions portray themselves as unbiased arbiters of the law, free from the political squabbles that influence political parties and even other IOs.

As most citizens will be getting their information filtered by at least one of these sources, I theorize that the IO's decision will not have a significant effect on citizens' behavior in a vacuum. As we have seen from literature analyzing the rise of populist and anti-globalist movements, public trust in international organizations is generally low compared to their trust in domestic elites, especially those from their own political party (Dellmuth et al 2021; Inglehart and Norris 2017; Rodrik 2017). I also believe that the IO statement alone will not be enough information for respondents to mentally situate what it would mean for their daily lives. Some level of interpretation from actors they have a stronger connection to will be needed to have the understanding and strength of opinion necessary to actually change their behavior. For both these reasons, I argue that citizens are unlikely to change their behavior if they are only

provided with the IO's statement.

**H1**: *Respondents are unlikely to change their behavior based solely on the organization's statement.*

### *Elite Cueing*

In most cases in which an IO issues a policy statement or mandate, domestic audiences will not have the technical knowledge necessary to completely understand or interpret what the decision means for them. They will have to rely on their domestic representatives to interpret the decision for them. Public audiences will not be getting their information directly from the mouth of the IO but from domestic representatives they trust. Whether these domestic elites support the IO's decision or not, it is their spin on the issue that domestic audiences will be hearing and basing their own opinion on. The majority of the public will fall back on partisanship, even against policies that are against their own best interests or that contradict their prior beliefs.

This will have an especially strong effect when elites choose to frame the issue in partisan terms. Prior literature has shown that domestic elites can turn even complex, apolitical issues into intensely partisan ones (Naoi and Kume 2015; Nelson and Steinberg 2018). I argue that even when citizens do have some basic understanding of the issue, they will fall back on partisanship if the representatives of their party take a different stance. Even high-information voters have been shown to make use of partisan heuristics when making political decisions, especially regarding whom they vote for (Walder and Strijbis, 2023). I argue that this effect will hold for other political behaviors, such as the choice of whether to follow environmental guidelines or the choice of whether to protest against or support an IO decision. As previously discussed, partisan elites can make substantial use of in-group bias and negative partisanship to get their base on their side of an issue. We have seen this specifically in regard to environmental issues, as conservatives have strongly opposed regulations and harshly criticized or mocked those on the left who disagree. Most citizens will not have the experience or knowledge to look at an IO's decision beyond the framework of their domestic, partisan politics, so this type of framing can be highly effective. For these reasons, I predict a strong correlation between the position domestic elites take on a policy and whether citizens will adhere to it.

**H2**: *Citizens are more likely to alter their behavior based on an IO's decision if domestic elites support the decision.*

**H3**: *Citizens are less likely to alter their behavior based on an IO's decision if domestic elites oppose the decision.*

### *Endorsement from the United Nations*

I have argued previously that, based on past literature, it seems that the public has little trust in international organizations as a whole. However, this varies based

on the particular organization being studied, and the United Nations, probably the most well-known and studied IO, has consistently been shown to have a positive effect on public opinion regarding a particular issue. Large organizations like the UN can portray themselves as a responsible big brother of sorts to smaller institutions and even to domestic governments; endorsement from them can lend legitimacy to decisions by those actors, even for citizens who were initially skeptical (Grieco et al 2011). Those who do not have great trust in the leadership of their own country can look to more like-minded leaders of other nations or organizations to situate how they should feel on an issue. The UN can, in effect, lend some of the legitimacy it holds in the eyes of the public to these other policymakers and organizations.

IOs can also portray themselves as representing the global consensus on an issue. Again, this is particularly the case for those with near universal membership like the UN and could be useful in helping support the message of a smaller, lesser-known group. Thompson (2006), among others, has argued that the UN is a particularly good policy messenger amongst IOs because of its wide recognition and large, heterogeneous membership base. These will be particularly helpful for a smaller, environmental organization that lacks the reach or diversity of membership that the UN does. A smaller environmental group cannot reasonably claim to represent a worldwide consensus on a policy, but the UN can. For these reasons, I predict a strong correlation between the position the United Nations takes on a policy and whether citizens will alter their behavior to adhere to it.

**H4**: *The endorsement of the United Nations will make it more likely that citizens alter their behavior based on the primary IO's decision.*

**H5**: *The opposition of the United Nations will make it less likely that citizens alter their behavior based on the primary IO's decision.*

### *Endorsement from Legal Institutions*

Finally, I look at the endorsement of legal institutions. It is important to look at this separately from other international organizations because of how they are characterized in both IR literature and the media. To many, courts are among the most legitimate of institutions, free from many of the biases that plague more politically oriented arguments, or at least should be (Grossman 2013). I argue that legal institutions upholding the IO's decision or mandate will have little effect on whether citizens change their behavior. This runs contrary to much of what has been theorized in the prior literature, which has stated that trust in international courts remains quite high in part due to their apoliticism (Grossman 2013; Voeten 2013).

However, the legal field is highly technical and often uses language, which creates higher barriers to entry for understanding amongst the general public. I believe this high level of technicality will make it difficult for the general public to relate the information to their day-to-day lives and may even open up the institutions to a degree of anti-intellectual sentiment, as fields that require higher levels of education often are (Merkley 2020; Motta 2017). Additionally, I believe that the apolitical nature

of courts' messaging will not be as effective as the highly partisan tone struck by domestic elites. Although courts are, of course, political actors in reality, many legal bodies try to portray themselves as apolitical, neutral arbiters of legality. Respondents will not have as strong a reaction to the courts' relatively neutral language as they will to representatives of their own political party supporting or denouncing a policy more aggressively. For these reasons, I believe that the endorsement of a court will not have a strong effect on whether citizens alter their behavior.

**H6**: *The endorsement of legal institutions will not have a significant effect on whether citizens alter their behavior based on the primary IO's decision.*

**H7**: *The opposition of legal institutions will not have a significant effect on whether citizens alter their behavior based on the primary IO's decision.*

## Research Design

These hypotheses will be tested via a randomized survey experiment, the results of which will be evaluated through an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) linear regression. A random sample of 10 UN member states, stratified by region using the UN's geoscheme categorizations, will be taken to establish which nations the survey will take place in. After these countries are determined, a random sample of 300 citizens in each country will be taken, and each will be randomly assigned to a treatment group. There will be seven groups: one control group and two treatment groups to test each of the three independent variables. Each respondent will be asked to provide their age, gender, ethnicity, approximate income, and which political party they most identify with. They will then be given the paper's proposed scenario.

### *Scenario*

The proposed scenario will revolve around the recommendation of a behavioral change made by a fictitious environmental group. The mandate or statement issued by the environmental group in this scenario will specifically focus on citizens changing their methods of transportation to those that are more climate-friendly. Transportation was chosen as the topic because, unlike many other environmental regulations, changing one's primary method of transportation, such as driving, walking, or cycling, is something that is actually actionable for most ordinary citizens. However, despite the ability to make changes on an individual level, transportation and infrastructure policy is still a major component of addressing climate change on an international scale.

The treatment groups will each get a different vignette describing the policy, each testing a different hypothesis. The control group will get a simple description of the issued decision, with no added information: "An environment advocacy group has issued a statement recommending that all citizens significantly cut down on air and car travel and replace them with more sustainable alternatives, such as walking, cycling, or driving electric vehicles. They also stated that governments should pass new laws providing tax incentives to those who make these changes in an effort to

promote sustainable transport. Does this recommendation make you more likely to change your own transportation methods?" All treatment groups will receive this blurb and be asked if they would change their behavior, but each treatment group will then receive different information. To test the elite cueing mechanism, two treatment groups will receive the above statement: "In response, (leader of your political party) has issued a statement supporting/denouncing the environmental group's decision." To test the IO endorsement mechanism, two treatment groups will receive "In response, the United Nations Secretary-General issued a statement supporting/denouncing the environmental group's decision. Does this recommendation make you more likely to change your own travel patterns?" To test the judicial mechanism, two treatment groups will receive "In the aftermath of the announcement, a federal court has ruled that it would be legal/illegal for the government to enact these tax incentives for those who follow the environmental group's decision."

***Outcome Variable***

The outcome variable for this study is the respondents' change in behavior. This will be measured using a five-point Likert scale, as respondents will be asked how likely they are to switch to more sustainable modes of transport. The five response choices will be "not at all likely," "somewhat unlikely," "unsure," "somewhat likely," and "definitely likely." In this study, change in behavior is measured as one's willingness to switch to more sustainable forms of transportation.

To capture a change in behavior as opposed to a change in beliefs in a survey experiment, the scenario must be something that can be acted upon fairly easily. When looking at environmental issues, sustainable transportation methods are something in which change of opinion has very little identifiable impact compared to actually taking action and changing one's routine. Changing from driving to cycling, walking, or using public transport is something that is possible for most people because there are few financial barriers.

***Explanatory Variable***

There are three primary explanatory variables for this study: *domestic elite cueing*, *endorsement by an international organization*, and *determination of legality from an international court*. Domestic elite cueing is operationalized as public support or opposition to the policy from the leaders of the major domestic political parties. To properly test the causal mechanism, it must be clear that the elite cueing comes from a partisan source. To see if elite cueing is as effective as theorized, the elites must be respected and trusted by the respondents. Presumably, the elites each respondent trusts the most are the leaders of their own political party, with whom they see eye-to-eye on most political issues.

Endorsement by an international organization is operationalized as the UN Secretary-General issuing a statement affirming or opposing the environmental group's decision. The United Nations was chosen as the IO in this scenario because of its high profile and the prior literature suggesting that the UN can make certain policies

more legitimate in some instances. To truly measure the influence of an international institution, the respondents must have some familiarity with the institution and its role in the geopolitical landscape. This level of familiarity will be much higher for the UN than most other organizations.

Endorsement by a judicial institution is operationalized as a federal court ruling that it is legal or illegal for the government to pass tax incentives for following the environmental group's recommendations. The causal mechanism revolves around whether members of the general public will be swayed by judicial institutions' very technical and highly specialized knowledge. The decision to focus specifically on the legality of the potential policies was made to put emphasis on the judicial institutions' particular scholarship and expertise, setting them apart from the institutions tested in the second mechanism.

### *Control Variables*

Each respondent's current *primary method of transport* will be controlled for, as some respondents may already use the sustainable transport methods recommended in the scenario. The respondents will be asked what mode of transport they utilize most often in their daily lives. These are people who would respond that the information would not change their behavior, but not because of the information I provided them. This could skew our results and thus must be controlled for. Additionally, the *type of community* (urban, suburban, or rural) each respondent lives in will be controlled for. This variable will help capture the infrastructure environment each of the respondents lives in, a pivotal factor in the types of transportation options available. Different modes of transportation will be more convenient, more affordable, or more available depending on how developed the area each respondent is living in is. This variable will use the Degree of Urbanization measure developed and utilized by organizations including the European Union, World Bank, and Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

Finally, demographic factors such as *age*, *gender*, *political party*, and *socioeconomic status* will be controlled. All demographic questions will be included in the survey questionnaire administered to each respondent. These factors could determine either which transportation options are feasible for an individual or their views regarding said options, so it is essential that they are accounted for.

### *Challenges and Feasibility*

The main challenge I anticipate with this study is that people's responses to the survey may not match their actions. It is easy to simply say that you will change your behavior when asked, but it takes a lot more effort to take actions that will upend your daily routine. This could lead to an overestimate of how many people will actually change their behavior when looking at the survey responses and regression results. An attempt to mitigate this has been made in the phrasing of the questions on the survey. Respondents are not asked whether they *will* change their behavior but rather whether

the provided information makes them *more likely* to change their behavior. This will make interpretation and analysis of the regression results easier.

Additionally, there may be an issue of the respondents feeling led to respond in a certain way by the questions. If the respondents understand that these changes truly would make a positive impact on the climate, they may feel uncomfortable admitting that they would not change their behavior, even if that is the case. This is mitigated in several ways. First, no concrete information or statistics are provided in the vignettes that quantify the environmental impact these policies will have. The respondents will instead have to decide whether they trust the words of the environmental group, domestic elites, the UN, or federal courts. To that end, the second part of the vignettes that the treatment group receives will also not contain specific numbers and simply stick to which parties support or oppose the measures. Hopefully, this will assist in measuring the relationship between the respondents' trust in these actors and their behavior rather than what the respondents feel is the morally correct answer.

## Discussion and Conclusion

The policy implications of this study are numerous, especially as environmental action becomes increasingly necessary in the face of rising climate change. Firstly, this study can help further clarify the directionality of influence between elites and the public. Looking at the change in effect when the support or opposition of domestic elites is introduced can help clarify how much people base their political actions on pure partisanship. If my hypotheses are supported, this supports the notion that citizens base their political opinions and behavior on that of the partisan elites they most trust. This suggests that the public does not make decisions based purely off of ideology in the traditional sense, but rather goes along with the party they already identify with on some important issues. This should inform future work on the relationship between ideology and behavior, particularly whether pure partisanship can override prior views and ideologies.

My work can also differentiate the effect that courts have compared to other IOs and institutions, if the effect is, in fact, different. My survey experiment will produce different results for the change in behavior inspired by the UN compared to the change inspired by courts. There is inconsistency within the literature as to whether judicial institutions should be looked at separately from other IOs and governmental bodies. Including both variables in the study and disaggregating them can show whether the public at large views them in different or similar ways.

Additionally, this study can help IOs as well as politicians determine the most effective messaging tactics for their policies, particularly regarding environmental issues. Messaging coordination between IOs and domestic elites, if they are on the same page on the policies, may be necessary to ensure compliance to the fullest extent. Domestic politicians can essentially act as interpreters of the IO's decision for unfamiliar or skeptical domestic audiences. IOs should take this into account when devising messaging or signaling tactics for their various initiatives and should promote partnerships with domestic actors on this front. This could inspire more

self-awareness on the part of some IOs, helping them realize that they do not have the reach or vantage point to effectively inspire changes within the public.

My study also presents several avenues for future research. Further research should continue to look at the effectiveness of incentives for sustainability policies. The proposed scenario includes the prospect of tax incentives for those citizens who utilize sustainable transport methods. Along with the changes when various other messengers are introduced, the initial results of this survey will show a baseline level of support for these incentives in conjunction with the environmental group's statement. Other authors can use a similar setup but with different incentives included to test the differing effects of each, as well as with different policies than the one used in this experiment. This will be useful to policymakers seeking the best ways to incentivize behavioral changes amongst their constituents.

Finally, future researchers should look at this relationship between messaging and behavior in the context of other issues, as well as other aspects of environmental policy. I argue that a similar survey experiment to mine could be used to measure the differing effects that each messenger has regarding different policies. Chief among these should be public health policy in the aftermath of the pandemic. While the inaction of some major governments is surely the biggest culprit, the unwillingness of many members of the public to change their behavior in accordance with safety guidelines had catastrophic global consequences. One can argue that domestic elites played a large role in this, as many right-leaning politicians around the world harshly criticized and defied the advice from the WHO and other organizations. Would more people have followed the mandates in the absence of this elite cueing? Performing a similar experiment revolving around public health mandates could answer this question and help unveil where the source of people's hesitancy emanated from.

## References

Barnett, M. N., & Finnemore, M. (1999). The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations. *International Organization*, 53(4), 699–732. doi:10.1162/002081899551048.

Bisgaard, M., & Slothuus, R. (2018). Partisan Elites as Culprits? How Party Cues Shape Partisan Perceptual Gaps. *American Journal of Political Science*, 62(2), 456–469. doi:10.1111/ajps.12349.

Chapman, T. L. (2009). Audience Beliefs and International Organization Legitimacy. *International Organization*, 63(4), 733–764. doi:10.1017/s0020818309990154.

Dellmuth, L. M., & Tallberg, J. (2020). Elite Communication and the Popular Legitimacy of International Organizations. *British Journal of Political Science*, 51(3), 1292–1313. doi:10.1017/s0007123419000620.

Dellmuth, L., Scholte, J. A., Tallberg, J., & Verhaegen, S. (2021). The Elite–Citizen Gap in International Organization Legitimacy. *American Political Science Review*, 116(1), 283–300. doi:10.1017/s0003055421000824.

Dur, A., & Schlipphak, B. (2020). Elite Cueing and Attitudes Towards Trade Agreements: The Case of TTIP. *European Political Science Review*, 13, 41–57. doi:10.1017/S175577392000034X.

Greenhill, B. (2018). How Can International Organizations Shape Public Opinion? Analysis of a Pair of Survey-Based Experiments. *The Review of International Organizations*, 15(1), 165–188. doi:10.1007/s11558-018-9325-4.

Grieco, J. M., Gelpi, C., Reifler, J., & Feaver, P. D. (2011). Let's Get a Second Opinion: International Institutions and American Public Support for War. *International Studies Quarterly*, 55(2), 563–583. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00660.x.

Grossman, N. (2012). The Normative Legitimacy of International Courts. *Temple Law Review*, 86(1), 61–107. doi:10.2139/ssrn.2185304.

Hurd, I. (2002). Legitimacy, Power, and the Symbolic Life of the UN Security Council. *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations*, 8(1), 35–51. doi:10.1163/19426720-00801006.

Inglehart, R., & Norris, P. (2017). Trump and the Populist Authoritarian Parties: The Silent Revolution in Reverse. *Perspectives on Politics*, 15(2), 443–454. doi:10.1017/s1537592717000111.

Khemani, S. (2020). An Opportunity to Build Legitimacy and Trust in Public Institutions in the Time of COVID-19. doi:10.1596/33715.

Maliniak, D., & Tierney, M. (2014). Legitimation Effect: Do Foreign Publics Care about IO Approval in the Use of Military Force? *PEIO Conference Paper*. Retrieved from http://wp.peio.me/wp-content/uploads/PEIO8/Maliniak,

Merkley, E. (2020). Anti-Intellectualism, Populism, and Motivated Resistance to Expert Consensus. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 84(1), 24–48. doi:10.1093/poq/nfz05.

Merkley, E., & Stecula, D. (2020). Party Cues in the News: Democratic Elites, Republican Backlash and the Dynamics of Climate Skepticism. *British Journal of Political Science*, 51(4), 1439–1456. doi:10.31219/osf.io/azrxm.

Motta, M. (2017). The Dynamics and Political Implications of Anti-Intellectualism in the United States. *American Politics Research*, 46(3). doi:10.1177/1532673X17719507.

Naoi, M., & Kume, I. (2015). Workers or Consumers? A Survey Experiment on the Duality of Citizens' Interests in the Politics of Trade. *Comparative Political Studies*, 48(10), 1293–1317. doi:10.1177/0010414015574879.

Nelson, S. C., & Steinberg, D. A. (2018). Default Positions: What Shapes Public Attitudes about International Debt Disputes? *International Studies Quarterly*, 62, 520–533. doi:10.1093/isq/sqy020.

Panke, D., Polat, G., & Hohlstein, F. (2022). Who Performs Better? A Comparative Analysis of Problem-Solving Effectiveness and Legitimacy Attributions to International Organizations. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 57(4), 433–456. doi:10.1177/00108367211036916.

Rodrik, D. (2018). Populism and the Economics of Globalization. *Journal of International Business Policy*, 1, 12–33. doi:10.3386/w23559.

Sanders, D., & Toka, G. (2013). Is Anyone Listening? Mass and Elite Opinion Cueing in the EU. *Electoral Studies*, 32(1), 13–25. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2012.10.001.

Tallberg, J., & Zürn, M. (2019). The Legitimacy and Legitimation of International Organizations: Introduction and Framework. *The Review of International Organizations*, 14(4), 581–606. doi:10.1007/s11558-018-9330-7.

Thompson, A. (2006). Coercion through IOS: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission. *International Organization*, 60(01).// doi:10.1017/s0020818306060012.

Tingley, D., & Tomz, M. (2021). The Effects of Naming and Shaming on Public Support for Compliance with International Agreements: An Experimental Analysis of the Paris Agreement. *International Organization*, 76(2), 445–468. doi:10.1017/s0020818321000394.

United Nations. (n.d.). Urbanization | Population Division. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/content/urbanization-0: :text=Today

Voeten, E. (2013). Public Opinion and the Legitimacy of International Courts. doi:10.1515/til-2013-021.

Walder, M., & Strijbis, O. (2023). The Partisan Heuristic and the Voters' Knowledge: The Essential Role of the Information Environment. *Electoral Studies*, 84. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2023.102641.