Climate Securitization: Trends in Norm Diffusion Through Network Analysis

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Abstract Why do some actors securitize climate change, and do other actors securitize in response? Through what methods is the norm of climate securitization diffused, and what factors influence the diffusion? This study seeks to answer these questions specifically through how proximity to the UNSC influences processes of norm diffusion of climate securitization through learning and emulation as well as agenda control. As states and IOs increase in proximity to the UNSC, more flow of information is expected to occur, and the norm of climate securitization spreads through learning and emulation. Additionally, states and IOs in proximity to the UNSC will be more hesitant to securitize as they fear the loss of agenda control and power to the UNSC. I examine the process of norm diffusion of climate securitization through a Stochastic Actor-Oriented Model (SAOM) network analysis, which produces parameter probabilities for the likelihood of securitization and is measured through text analysis of climate policy decisions. My study has important implications for climate compliance, securitization, and equitable climate policy.

Introduction

The trend to securitize climate change in order to evoke greater change has been ongoing, yet its effects have been understudied. Some studies have found securitization of climate change to be ineffective, citing inefficiency or inaction concerns following securitization, yet many IGOs and nations continue to securitize (Methmann & Rothe, 2012; Dellmuth et al., 2017; Oels, 2013; Trombetta, 2008; Warner & Ingrid, 2019). Recently on April 18th, NATO reinforced its commitment to the environment and security, stating, "The earth's rapidly changing climate and an increase in weather extremes have led NATO to accelerate its efforts in environmental security and environmental protection" (NATO, 2024). However, some actors, such as many small island developing states like Papua New Guinea, chose not to securitize. Why do some actors securitize climate change, and do other actors securitize in response? Through what methods is the norm of climate securitization diffused, and what factors influence the diffusion?

This research investigates the norm diffusion of the securitization of climate change through Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs), specifically how proximity to the UNSC influences climate securitization and how mechanisms of learning and emulation and agenda control affect securitization. Climate security refers to any threats to nations, communities, and individuals as a cause of climate change

(Dellmuth et al., 2017). The securitization of climate change refers to the framing of climate change issues as posing grave security threats to nations, communities, and individuals, requiring urgent action (Warner & Ingrid, 2019). The literature examines climate security from angles of state and human security. State security pertains to safeguarding sovereignty, military, power, diplomacy, and peace within the international system (Dellmuth et al., 2017). NATO and the UNSC are regarded as two IGOs where a state climate security approach is utilized (Dellmuth et al., 2017). Human security, on the other hand, focuses on individuals and communities with policy areas of development, disaster risk reduction, human rights, and migration (Dellmuth et al., 2017). UN agencies are often cited for applying this approach with a focus on human insecurity rather than conflict management (Dellmuth et al., 2017).

In order to answer the question of why actors securitize or if they securitize in response to other actors, examining norm diffusion will provide valuable insights into how the norm of climate security diffuses globally and how indirect enforcement mechanisms of climate security policy operate. Literature exists on the norm diffusion of climate change issues at the international level, but not on the norm diffusion of climate change securitization at the international level. Examining norm diffusion of the securitization of climate change can provide valuable insights into why securitization of climate change occurs and what motivates its spread, especially as some research has found securitization of climate change to be ineffective. My research extends arguments of agenda control beyond examination of P5 and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and moves to an extensive network analysis of 534 IOs and 213 states that incorporates norm diffusion mechanisms to better understand how the norm of securitization spreads across many countries and IOs, especially at the international level and through IOs, which is largely understudied.

I argue that the network proximity of an IO or state to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) increases the flow of information, which will contribute to the norm diffusion of the securitization of climate change through learning and emulation. States and IOs closer in proximity to the UNSC, measured through formal and informal connections, have a higher likelihood of securitizing climate change through causal mechanisms of learning and emulation and agenda control. Proximity to the UNSC allows for more flow of information, which leads to norm diffusion of climate securitization. Furthermore, states and IOs further from the UNSC will fear the loss of power and agenda control if they securitize, so norm diffusion to those actors further from the UNSC will be less likely.

First, I will discuss the existing literature on norm diffusion, followed by the literature on securitization, and finally with those on the specific norm diffusion of climate change and climate change securitization. I identify a gap in the literature on how the norm of climate change securitization diffuses. Then, I will expand upon my theory and hypotheses. I will proceed with a discussion of my research methodology. Finally, I will conclude by discussing the implications of my study.

Literature Review

Norm Diffusion

Finnemore's (1998) norm 'lifecycle' sets up the framework for norm diffusion used broadly across international relations literature, including climate change norm diffusion. The lifecycle details the evolution of a norm from "norm emergence", to "norm acceptance", to "norm cascade", and finally "internalization" (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). The "tipping point," which takes a norm from "norm emergence" to "norm acceptance," is especially important as it also relies on the involvement of various actors that have the ability to influence how the norm is perceived and make it a "norm" (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998).

Policy and norm diffusion occurs through processes of coercion, competition, emulation, and learning. Norm diffusion occurs through coercion when several powerful actors influence others through a forceful "top-down" approach via incentives or being hegemons of ideas, such as how preferential trade agreements have the ability to influence states' human rights stances (Hafner-Burton, 2005; Dobbin, Simmons, & Garrett, 2007). Competition between state rivalries can also create norm diffusion when actors merge and focus on policies that will bring the most benefit for them; common in economic policy (Drezner, 2001). Norm diffusion occurs through emulation when smaller actors seek to replicate the actions of global or regional leaders, especially in cases of uncertainty where more legitimate or successful organizations can serve as models, usually those geographically or culturally close to them (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Elkins & Simmons, 2005). Finally, norm diffusion can proceed through learning when there is a concrete goal or problem that needs to be addressed, and actors are able to develop theories and solutions and evaluate their effectiveness (Elkins & Simmons, 2005).

Several factors, including interconnectedness and domestic politics, influence how norms and policies are diffused and the effectiveness of their diffusion. Diffusion among IOs is greatly increased through interconnectedness, as this allows for easy flow and exchange of information that can facilitate norm diffusion through any of the four processes discussed above (Sommerer & Tallberg, 2019; Zhukov & Stewart, 2013). IOs have the ability to create social networks, which influence how their member states shape politics. Furthermore, network position proximity in IGO networks is found to increase policy diffusion more strongly through networks facilitating policy learning than those that facilitate emulation (Cao, 2010). International policy diffusion is also greatly influenced by domestic politics, including political opportunity and economic factors such as deregulation and privatization (Biesenbender & Tosun, 2014; Graham et al., 2012).

Securitization

In examining securitization, the decision to securitize and frame climate change as a security concern is reliant on various factors, both domestic and international. Regional security contexts, as well as vulnerability to climate change, are shown to correlate with the framing of climate change in a human security context (Krampe &

Mobjörk, 2018). Furthermore, the decision to securitize or not can reflect a state's strategic decision to decide and control an agenda at an international level (Arias, 2022). Many may be hesitant to securitize if the Security Council will be in charge of the response because they will lose authority over decision-making (Scott, 2012). I build on Arias's work of agenda control and add novel contributions of norm diffusion rather than simple framing, incorporating diffusion mechanisms, examining both states and IOs versus just P5 versus SIDS, and doing extensive network analysis that paints a more holistic and realistic picture of the international climate network. These contributions are valuable because they allow the argument of agenda control to be generalizable to more IOs and states. The P5 and SIDS don't exist in a closed network, so examining all the connections that exist allows for a better understanding of the mechanisms behind climate securitization.

In studying the effectiveness of the securitization of climate change, scholars have identified several dimensions with which to determine its effectiveness, including the output of norms from the regime, behavioral outcomes and effects, and the overall substantive impact related to climate change (Dellmuth et al., 2017). The apocalyptic and existential language used in climate security contexts does not reflect significant policy changes, but instead piecemeal and technical solutions as would typically occur with risk management strategies (Methmann & Rothe, 2012; Oels, 2013). The Copenhagen School has found that there has been an overall "failed securitization" of climate change; however, other scholars have pointed instead to how security practices have become influenced and challenged by climate change in a "climatization" of security (Oels, 2013; Trombetta, 2008). There is a gap in the literature more broadly about integrated governance and the way in which climate change and security interact with themselves and other issues areas (Dellmuth et al., 2017).

The case of the Dutch Delta Advisory Commission's attempt to securitize climate change was found to be unsuccessful as it attempted to create a sense of urgency, but it was not followed with subsequent urgent action, demonstrating the disingenuity of the apocalyptic discourse used and fueling distrust (Warner & Ingrid, 2019). The public began to be pushed in the opposite direction and deny and disengage with the problem entirely, which can be labeled as the problem of the "policy boomerang", where labeling an issue an attempt to appeal to an audience, in this case, securitizing climate change in order to instill urgency, cannot be controlled with how it is received by the audience (Warner & Ingrid, 2019; van Buuren & Warner, 2014). While utilizing the "security" label in climate change was intended to gain leverage, it had the opposite effect and backfired, which demonstrates the importance of domestic and international audiences in responding to the security framing in order for it to be successful (van Buuren & Warner, 2014). While these examples illustrate the ineffectiveness of the securitization of climate change, there is an overall lack of both quantitative and qualitative studies explaining why states continue to securitize despite these concerns and how the norm of climate security spreads, especially at the international level.

Norm Diffusion of Climate Change Securitization

Looking more closely at norm diffusion in the context of securitizing climate change, much literature has examined regional and national diffusion of climate change policy more broadly, but a gap exists in examining norm diffusion of the securitization of climate change from an international to state level and the factors that influence it.

International agreements, international learning collaboration, and integration of epistemic communities facilitate norm diffusion of climate policy. International policy diffusion can occur through multilateral agreements such as the Paris Climate Agreement, which contributed to the norm diffusion of adaptation through encouraging commitments and increasing transparency (Lesnikowski et al., 2017). In advanced democracies, air emission standards are diffused via the process of learning at international conventions, and additional implementation of standards is reliant on international pressure (Biesenbender & Tosun, 2014). Studies also find that international harmonization and transnational communication facilitate the convergence of environmental domestic policy, but regulatory competition does not (Holzinger et al., 2008). While these arguments explain climate policy as a whole, factors that influence the securitization of climate change have been less studied. At the regional level, epistemic communities, such as those in the EU, greatly contributed to the norm diffusion of the securitization of climate change in the EU (Zwolski & Kaunert, 2011). However, to my knowledge, no studies exist surrounding factors that influence international policy diffusion of the securitization of climate change, yet this has the potential to influence climate security the most.

Some say that global climate policies are sought to push an agenda and national governments have the ability to depoliticize climate change through norm diffusion (Yazar et al., 2023). The politicization of climate change is seen as one of the two main factors that will affect the ability to address climate change at the level of international institutions (Depledge & Feakin, 2012). The use of policy diffusion in a strategic manner, for example, to advance the framing of climate change in a security context, requires further examination (Yazar et al., 2023).

Insufficient research exists surrounding how policy diffusion of the securitization of climate change occurs, especially from the international to national level, and studies mostly consist of theory rather than findings. Some studies have examined the extent to which climate policy is securitized, but have not tested the mechanisms through which it occurs. The Copenhagen School considers an issue fully securitized when the issue becomes one of "emergency" status and can bypass traditional democratic processes and politics due to security concerns (Scott, 2012). Climate security, as of 2020, is in the first stage of the norm's life cycle, so identifying what factors lead to successful norm diffusion of securitization is vital to understanding its progression (Odeyemi, 2020). While scholars make predictions as to why certain countries may be more receptive to securitization, including how convinced they are that climate change is a security issue and who will dictate and fund mitigation responses, they do not directly test these theories, which is what my study aims to do (Scott, 2012; Odeyemi, 2020).

Theory and Hypotheses

I argue that the network proximity of an IO or state to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) increases the flow of information, which will contribute to norm diffusion of the securitization of climate change through learning and emulation. Specifically, the closer an actor is to the UNSC, the more norm diffusion of climate securitization will occur. My main independent variable is network proximity to the UNSC. My dependent variable is norm diffusion of climate securitization. My causal mechanisms are learning and emulation, as well as agenda control.

Conceptually, a network of IOs and states simply refers to the connections that exist between them. For example, many regional IOs, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), two regional African IOs, are in a network with other IOs in that region, as well as with larger IOs such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and state actors such as Ethiopia and Ghana.

Past literature has found that interconnectedness increases the flow of information between IOs and contributes to norm diffusion, so I expect the same causal mechanism to follow regarding norm diffusion of the securitization of climate change (Sommerer & Tallberg, 2019; Cao, 2010). As connections between the UNSC and IOs and states increase, the transmission of ideas and policy related to the securitization of climate change will also increase. Learning will occur as a result of being present at conferences and being part of international agreements. IOs and states alike will look to their external environment in order to learn new approaches to climate change and, from the policy decisions of others, emulate behaviors. Proximity to the UNSC will increase the flow of information, which will present more opportunities for learning and emulation and lead to the norm diffusion of climate securitization.

Following the second causal mechanism of agenda control, I expect IOs and states that are closer to the UNSC to be more likely to securitize climate change as a response to the UNSC securitizing because those actors that are further from the UNSC will fear loss of power and decision-making to the UNSC. Once an issue becomes securitized, IOs like the Security Council may gain authority to pursue responses as the issue becomes one of global security, and traditional politics and policymaking may be undercut (Scott, 2012; Odeyemi, 2020). Arias (2022) finds that P5 states are more likely to securitize as opposed to SIDS because of fears of loss of control to the UNSC. Extending this argument, IOs that are closer to the UNSC will generally expect the UNSC to work alongside them and securitize because they do not fear loss of decision-making authority. NATO does not fear losing power to the UNSC because it works together alongside the UNSC to promote similar security and climate goals. The closer the IO is to the UNSC, the more power it will also have in the diffusion of information from the UNSC, so it is able to pursue its ideas without fear of loss of power. States that are closer to the UNSC are also likely to securitize because they can expect to have more agenda-setting power within the UNSC if securitization does lead to decisions being made largely through the UNSC. For example, the US will not fear securitization because it has great power in the UNSC; however, a smaller state

like Libya may be more hesitant to securitize because it does not have great power in the UNSC.

Network connections between the UNSC and IOs consist of nodes of formal connectivity of similar state memberships and institutional linkages and also of informal connectivity, such as similar issue area, geographical proximity, and headquarters location (Sommerer & Tallberg, 2019). For example, regarding institutional linkages in security policy, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the European Union (EU) form a functional networking relationship that synergizes policy outputs and creates better success (Biermann, 2008). Informal connectivity between IOs includes similar issue area in security and conflict as they operate in shared spaces on the same issues and may have similar norms and methods. Shared geographical proximity is another form of informal connectivity because they share cultural and language norms. If a norm is spread to one IO, it may spread to the other because of existing, past diffusion of shared norms. Furthermore, informal connectivity between IOs also includes the proximity of headquarters to New York, the headquarters location of the UNSC. For example, many IOs such as the UN, UNICEF, and the World Economic Forum with headquarters in New York may experience norm diffusion because of the potential shared experiences and company cultures related to being headquartered in the same city.

Proximity provides opportunities for learning because the flow of information is increased, so IOs have more access to models and ideas of other IOs and are more likely to adopt them. Climate security is a relatively new concept, so learning about it from other IOs creates an increased chance that the IO will adopt it themselves. Emulation is also a likely byproduct of formal connectivity because IOs look to others similar to them for policy information. As IOs securitize climate change, other IOs are more likely to emulate their response and securitize as well, regardless if the securitization was effective, but rather if the securitization occurred. Informal connectivity has the potential to lead to learning and emulation because geographical proximity creates shared experiences. If an IO in a region securitizes climate policy, others in the same region may expect similar results, learn from their behaviors, and emulate their policy. As more IOs adopt climate security framing and policy, the norm will continue to evolve and become more commonplace among other IOs.

Similar mechanisms occur of norm diffusion of climate securitization from the UNSC to states through formal and informal connections. Formal connections, including being a P5 member and having similar memberships in organizations with institutional arrangements with the UNSC as well as informal connections of regional proximity, are likely to lead to norm diffusion of climate securitization. Formal connections as a part of a network of a state document the interactions of states with other states as well as IOs, which allow for the flow of information. Informal connections as a part of a network of a state point to the shared cultural and language norms, as they do with IOs, which point to a greater norm similarity and a greater willingness to adopt new similar norms.

Processes of emulation and learning from the IO to the state occur via attendance at conventions as well as participation in international agreements. Learning processes such as attending international conferences provide the opportunity to understand more complex issues, such as climate change, and how it relates to security. General climate change policy, specifically air emission standards, has been diffused at international conferences through means of both emulation and learning, so I expect climate security to follow similar mechanisms (Biesenbender & Tosun, 2014). For example, the annual UN climate change conferences (COPs) include the participation of various state and non-state actors and lead the way for innovative climate change ideas, such as the securitization of climate change, to spread. Furthermore, participation in the Paris Climate Agreement (PCA) has been shown to increase norm diffusion of climate change ideas broadly through increased transparency and encouraging commitments, so climate change securitization may become more normalized through the PCA as concerns of loss of agency may dissipate through learning and emulation (Lesnikowski et al., 2017). If countries see that others are adopting a climate securitization approach as part of their nationally determined contributions (NDCs), they are more likely to do the same.

Coercion and competition, two mechanisms aside from learning and emulation that are named in the norm diffusion literature, are not expected to be the driving motivating forces behind the diffusion of climate securitization because of the voluntary nature of climate goals at the IO level as well as the lack of necessity for a rivalry to achieve such goals (Hafner-Burton, 2005; Dobbin, Simmons, & Garrett, 2007; Drezner, 2001). Climate change agreements, such as the PCA, rely on indirect enforcement mechanisms, which are not legally binding, so states are not as easily coerced into securitizing as with other issue areas, such as trade, where agreements are legally binding. As well, climate change securitization is not a policy decision to compete for as one state's decision to securitize does not affect another state's decision to securitize in the same way that tax policy, for example, may affect other investor tax policies because the costs and benefits to do so do not change as they do with tax policy. Learning and emulation are more likely to be present than competition and coercion.

Learning and emulation are likely to occur in IOs as securitization becomes more commonplace as a whole. The idea of integrating fields of security and climate change and the impact of this integration is relatively new and understudied, but more and more organizations, such as NATO and the UNSC, are adopting this approach. Through networks, IOs and states become more exposed to systems thinking approaches where security and climate change are inherently linked. Some deem this process as the "climatization" of security, which has the same impact of increasing the norm diffusion of climate securitization as more fields get linked and more IOs and states get exposed to these linkages (Oels, 2013; Trombetta, 2008). As more policymakers learn about the security impacts of climate change, they are more likely to securitize climate change. Some say the linkage of climate and security is ineffective, but norm diffusion is not reliant upon how effective the norm actually is, but rather whether it is socially

accepted, especially by experts in epistemic communities (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Dobbin, Simmons, & Garrett, 2007). Securitization has failed to be successful in certain instances because it has been followed by policy inaction to move forward with the securitization of climate change (Oels, 2013; Trombetta, 2008; Warner & Ingrid, 2019; van Buuren & Warner, 2014). However, these concerns point to the efficacy of securitization, but not whether or not states securitize. While they may prevent some states from securitizing, states generally don't know how the securitization will be received or what policy will be put in place until after they decide to do so, so it will not fully prevent the norm diffusion of climate securitization.

H1: *As the network proximity of an IO to the UNSC increases, so does the norm diffusion of climate securitization to an IO.*

H2: *As a state's network proximity to the UNSC increases, so does the norm diffusion of climate securitization to that state.*

Research Design

In order to conduct a network analysis, I will follow Kinne and Bunte's (2018) Stochastic Actor-Oriented Model (SAOM). I model my independent variable of network proximity to the UNSC as a measure of several formal and informal connections after Sommerer and Tallberg (2019). The Stochastic Actor-Oriented Model (SAOM) is useful in evaluating networks using statistical inference by simulating network characteristics (Kinne & Bunte, 2018; Kalish, 2019). Norm diffusion of climate security is conceptualized as the likelihood that a "securitization tie" will occur based on a high frequency of securitization language of the IO or state. Frequency of securitization is a text analysis measure of climate security wording found in policy decisions. The unit of analysis in this study is IO-year and actor-year. I will examine 534 IOs and 213 nations from the Correlates of War Intergovernmental Organizations dataset between 1970 and 2014 since those are the only available IOs and states in the dataset and climate security will only be relevant after 1970. Climate security language is examined for those same states and IOs, but from years ranging from 1970-2023 in order to accurately capture recent advancements in climate security. The measures of the IV of proximity to the UNSC should not be drastically different in 2014 versus 2023, so the data will still be valid and relevant.

The SAOM will determine if an actor will maximize its utility in the network in response to an IV. Essentially, is a securitization tie likely to happen given the proximity to the UNSC? Networks are created of connections, or nodes, and the "degree distribution" refers to the frequency of a node's ties within the network (Kinne & Bunte, 2018). In the SAOM, actors, in this case, IOs and states, are treated as actors with attributes with ties, or nodes, that form a network (Kalish, 2019). The decision of the central actor is based on the structure of the network, their own attributes, and the attributes of other actors (Kalish, 2019). The SAOM uses data from a point in time to determine if a hypothesized effect will produce a network structure and actor attributes at later time points (Kalish, 2019). Network ties and actor attributes are determined from an established set of "rules" (Kalish, 2019). Each decision by an

actor to optimize its network or act on an attribute is called a ministep (Kalish, 2019).

The following equation will be employed in the network analysis:

$$f_i^{\text{net}}(x, z) = \sum\nolimits_k \beta_k^{\text{net}} s_{ik}{}^{\text{net}}(x, z),$$

where actor i seeks to optimize its network in a ministep.

This equation represents how well the network operates for actor i given network state x and i's level of the attribute z. The outcome is dependent upon parameter β_k^{net} and effect s_{ik}^{net}. An effect is a function of the attributes of actors sending or receiving ties, or a subgraph count in the network neighborhood of the focal actor in a specific ministep. The parameter value, estimated using the method of moments, of a given effect converts into probabilities for change in actor i's network and attributes (Snijders, 2001). This approach results in a set of parameter values and standard errors linked to effects that connect changing actor qualities and network ties, producing results most consistent with the panel measurements (Kalish, 2019).

In order to apply the SAOM to my analysis, network state x will include 534 IOs and 213 countries as provided in the Correlates of War-Intergovernmental Organizations dataset. A network analysis will be run for each actor in relation to the UNSC. Attributes and effects will be the various measures of proximity to the UNSC as well as control variables. In order to quantify proximity to the UNSC, I code formal and informal connections following Sommerer and Tallberg's (2019) categorization. Formal connections will include overlapping memberships and institutional arrangements. Informal connections will include similar issue area, regional proximity, and headquarter proximity.

In order to establish a variable for overlapping or shared memberships between the UNSC and other IOs, data from the Correlates of War-Intergovernmental Organizations (COW-IGO) at the country-year unit of analysis will be used. Pairwise comparisons between 534 IOs and 213 states will produce overlaps in membership. If the number of identical memberships within a dyad (UNSC and IO) is between 0-20 percent, it is coded 0. If the number of identical memberships within a dyad is between 20-40 percent, it is coded 1. If the number of identical memberships within a dyad is between 40-60 percent, it is coded 2. If the number of identical memberships within a dyad is between 60-80 percent, it is coded 3. If the number of identical memberships within a dyad is between 80-100 percent, it is coded 4.

A formal connection between the UNSC and states is being a P5 member. This is coded as a binary variable. Another variable of formal connections of institutional arrangements will be gathered from the *Yearbook of International Organization* with information about various partnership agreements, observer status, memoranda, and more. This will be a binary variable with partnership linkages between the UNSC and IOs. If a state is part of an IO with institutional linkages to the UNSC, this will also be coded as a binary formal connection.

Similar issue area will also be accounted for as an informal connection. If the IO falls under the security/conflict functional orientation, it will be coded 1; otherwise, it will be coded 0.

In order to quantify the informal connection of regional proximity, IOs will be assigned similarity scores based on the world region of the P5 (Asia, North America, and Europe). For countries, being part of the same world region as a country in the P5 will result in high similarity scores. Finally, the informal connection of having headquarters in the same location for IOs will result in having a score of 1 if they are within 50 miles of New York since that is the location of the UNSC headquarters. This data will be taken from the *Yearbook of International Organization*.

Additional attributes that will also act as control variables in this network analysis will include military, political, and economic factors as modeled after Kinne and Bunte (2018). This data is gathered for each country-year from the World Bank dataset (unless otherwise specified). Military factors include military power, shared military threats, and NATO membership. Political factors include regime type (taken from Freedom House), UNGA voting similarity (taken from UN voting data), and former colonial ties. Economic factors include GDPPC and bilateral trade. Following Sommerer and Tallberg's (2019) controls for the success of an IO, I will also control for the accession of new member states as states will join IOs that are more successful. Successful IOs are defined as ones in which a state has joined in the past 5 years, and the measure will be binary. I also control for factors that may affect the implementation of climate security policy such as OECD membership, level of NDC implementation, and resource reliance. Level of NDC implementation will be a 0-3 variable indicating the degree of ambitiousness of NDC proportional to GDP as well as greenhouse gas emissions, proportional to their NDC goal, also coded 0-3. This data is found via the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) NDC Contribution Registry ("Nationally Determined Contributions Registry"). Resource reliance is measured as having more than 25 percent of GDP in total natural resources rents from World Bank data.

The dependent variable of securitization of climate change is measured through the likelihood of a "securitization tie" occurring in the network analysis. A securitization tie occurs when the UNSC and the actor in question both securitize. The UNSC always securitizes, but the variance in whether the actor in question (IO or state) will securitize will be defined through frequency of climate security language. I utilize text analysis to examine the extent to which securitization language is used in conjunction with climate language in formal policy decisions of IOs and states, binding or non-binding. This novel dataset will contain statements of climate and climate security across 534 IOs and 213 countries, the same ones as the COW-IGO dataset. These measures are more relevant to examine climate security norm diffusion as the framing and content of policy is more important as opposed to governance structures. Each IO and state will be ranked on a scale of 0 to 20, binned based on the frequency of the appearance of climate security language. A securitization tie will occur when the frequency is in the higher ranks of the 0 to 20 scale. Model 1 will include the total measures of frequency of climate security language found within policy decisions while Model 2 will include the proportion of climate security language compared to all climate language in policy decisions.

Data for this text analysis will be drawn from each individual IO and country from Nexis Uni and processed with MAXQDA. Reports of policy decisions by IOs and countries will be analyzed one actor at a time. Keywords of "climate change," "adaptation," "resilience," "mitigation," "greenhouse gases," "weather," and "carbon," if identified to be used in a climate policy context by an IO or country, will represent the appearance of climate language. Keywords of "climate security," "hazard," "climate migration," "conflict," "risk," and "climate vulnerability," if identified to be used in a climate policy context by an IO or country, will represent the appearance of climate security language.

The resulting outputs from the SAOM will be parameter scores measuring the likelihood of a securitization tie, whether or not both the UNSC and the actor in question will securitize. Parameter estimates are the coefficients indicating the degree of correlation/causality between the IV (proximity to UNSC) and DV (both securitizing). Higher parameter scores indicate a higher likelihood of a securitization tie based on proximity to the UNSC.

Potential concerns with this experimental method may include problematic conceptualization of certain variables or time frame concerns, but this model is still effective in determining how the norm of climate security diffuses. It may be problematic to say that securitization is binary, but little precedent exists for quantifying norm diffusion at an international level. This is the first study to employ this network analysis at such a large scale to measure securitization, so this measure is sufficient, and future research can disaggregate it further. Furthermore, there is a time gap between the DV and IV, but the IVs have not changed significantly while DVs have, so it will still be representative of norm diffusion of climate securitization.

I attempt to avoid sample bias and selection effects through incorporating a large sample of IOs and states, but it cannot be guaranteed that results are completely unbiased. Potential confounders of domestic factors of securitization as well as the scope of the issue area of IOs may lead states to securitize less than others, but the controls I include should account for many potential confounders. However, the large number of controls can contribute to multicollinearity or mixed findings, so this should be considered when interpreting the results.

Discussion and Conclusion

This study examines the norm diffusion of climate securitization, specifically how proximity to the UNSC influences processes of learning and emulation as well as agenda control. As states and IOs increase in proximity to the UNSC, a greater flow of information is expected to occur, and the norm of climate securitization spreads through learning and emulation. Additionally, states and IOs further in proximity to the UNSC will be more hesitant to securitize as they fear loss of agenda control and power to the UNSC. I examine the process of norm diffusion of climate securitization through my network analysis and text analysis, contributing to the larger body of climate security and norm diffusion literature.

The Paris Climate Agreement has faced great criticism for relying on indirect

enforcement mechanisms. Studying climate change normatively is important as climate policy is reliant on indirect enforcement mechanisms, so if the securitization of climate change becomes a norm, it could have a greater impact on policy and would be easier to implement (Keohane & Oppenheimer, 2016). The ability to understand the indirect enforcement mechanism of complying with a norm (in this case, securitization of climate) can point to ways to enforce climate compliance.

Climate change is not intrinsically linked to security, so understanding how others frame climate change in a security context and its importance is vital for the diffusion of climate security policy and norms. It could point to how actors can have greater or lesser means to enforce climate policy, security policy, and climate security policy. It can also be useful to understand norm diffusion and the mechanisms through which climate securitization becomes more commonplace as it could point lawmakers and various bodies to ways to control the norm diffusion of climate securitization.

Facing increasing criticism of the effectiveness of climate securitization, understanding how the norm of climate securitization travels can be useful in understanding how it is implemented as well as where exactly climate securitization is ineffective. Understanding norm diffusion mechanisms can allow for greater identification of failures and point to potential ways to improve or make the securitization process more efficient and effective.

Finally, this study contributes to the discussion of equitable climate policy. If IOs and states fear securitizing climate because they will lose control to the UNSC, this points to grave equity concerns in addressing climate change. If the world is to undergo a true "just transition" away from fossil fuels, it must do so equitably. States, especially those affected the most, are likely to be further away in proximity to the UNSC. They face the gravest climate security concerns, yet they may be hesitant to securitize based on concerns of loss of power. If they can securitize without the fear of loss of agency, their ability to address climate change can be improved. Working to effectively address climate change is incredibly important, and understanding how norm diffusion of climate securitization occurs can point to ways in which the most vulnerable populations can be protected and supported.

Future studies can extend this work to conduct a more thorough investigation of the underlying causal mechanisms, including the incorporation of case studies. While learning and emulation are expected to be the leading causal mechanisms for norm diffusion, more work can disaggregate data to figure out which norm diffusion mechanisms operate here. Furthermore, while agenda control is expected to be another leading causal mechanism, future work can further test this argument more directly. As the norm of climate securitization continues to diffuse, understanding its mechanisms, efficacy, and impact is incredibly important to addressing climate change equitably, efficiently, and effectively.

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