By Daniel Golzari

Abstract: Sanctions remain a central tool in international relations to influence or punish states violating global norms. Yet, their effectiveness against authoritarian regimes is debated, as such regimes frequently adopt sophisticated survival strategies. This research addresses an empirical puzzle: why are sanctioned autocracies shifting from isolationist mechanisms toward collective cooperation via authoritarian international organizations (IOs)? Through mixed-methods analysis combining quantitative data (1990–2023) and qualitative case studies of Russia, Iran, and Syria, this study investigates how authoritarian IO membership enhances regime stability by mitigating sanctions’ impacts. The study identifies three mechanisms: material substitution, diplomatic shielding, and strategic coordination that authoritarian IOs use to circumvent sanctions collectively. Findings suggest that membership in such organizations increases regime durability and decreases leadership turnover under sanction-induced pressure. Consequently, policymakers should rethink traditional sanction designs, targeting authoritarian alliances, the “Club of Autocrats” that offer economic, diplomatic, and strategic support. This research underlines the limits of sanctions and suggests a broader strategy combining economic pressure with diplomacy and support for liberal institutions to erode authoritarian resilience.