By Ethan Thomas Hoadley

Abstract: Vote-buying within the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) presents a unique and significant challenge to the international community. This article delves into the complex dynamics behind vote-buying in the UNGA, with a specific focus on three prominent mechanisms: financial development aid, diplomatic political coercion, and military capabilities. Drawing on existing literature and empirical evidence, this research investigates how powerful nations strategically employ financial development aid to secure favorable voting outcomes in the UNGA. It further analyzes the subtle tactics of diplomatic coercion employed by influential states to sway the voting behaviors of other states. Additionally, this study sheds light on the often opaque realm of military arms deals, elucidating how the provision of arms and military assistance functions as a tool for securing votes in the UNGA. By comprehensively exploring these three causal mechanisms, this
article aims to deepen our understanding of vote-buying in the UNGA. Furthermore, it highlights the challenges posed by vote-buying and explores the potential benefits of addressing these challenges to foster a more transparent and equitable decision-making process within the UN.