By Mason Blackburn

Abstract: Trade is generally considered to have a pacifying effect on interstate conflict, but recent literature has identified cases where this relationship may not hold true. Moreover, there is no consensus regarding the role of economically and militarily vital strategic goods in shaping this dynamic. This study aims to contribute to this nuanced subject by proposing a new systematic approach to define and operationalize strategic goods, thereby explaining the variations observed in previous theories and empirical findings. Drawing on trade network theory and the literature on international cartels, I demonstrate how the export of similar strategic goods can foster peaceful relationships between rival exporters through the formation of cartels and the desire to avoid international intervention. These mechanisms suggest that conflicts should be less likely to arise between rival strategic goods exporters, and if they do occur, their duration should be shorter compared to other conflicts. Logistic regressions and a Cox Hazard Duration model are employed to assess this relationship empirically. This paper not only provides quantitative and argumentative contributions to the trade-conflict literature but also offers policymakers a fresh perspective on the future of significant international relationships, such as the trade rivalry between the United States and China.