By Cameron Ahern

Abstract: Climate change has been a pressing yet understudied issue within international affairs due to its unique institutional features. Notably, authoritarian regimes have exhibited perplexing patterns of cooperation in international climate change forums. Existing literature and theoretical arguments fail to fully account for the distinct characteristics of climate change, including its large-scale externalities, weak enforcement mechanisms, and the inclusion of public goods. This study argues that authoritarian regimes are compelled to sign costly climate change agreements not only based on their political win-share, but also due to business ties among actors within the political sphere. To test this theory, the variables will be operationalized using the V-Party dataset, which provides metrics characterizing a country’s political actors. Poisson regression models will be employed, considering the dependent variable as a count of the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) that have been created, revised, or improved. This research carries significant policy implications, addressing the rise of global authoritarianism and offering insights to policymakers regarding cooperation trends with traditionally uncooperative regimes. Furthermore, it contributes to the limited literature on the causal effects of climate change in the field of International Relations research.