By Jackson Leith

Abstract: Existing literature has provided insights into the who, when, and what aspects of political leaders’ ability to shape individual-level trade preferences through elite-cueing. However, little research has been conducted on the most effective communication methods for achieving this outcome. This paper aims to address this gap by examining variations in the effectiveness of different communication methods used by political leaders—specifically rhetoric, sharing academic research or expert opinions, traditional media, and social media—in influencing individual- level trade preferences. This includes preferences of the overall public as well as those within the same or opposite political party as the communicator. The paper proposes two causal mechanisms, namely partisan support/opposition associated with the communication method and the credibility of the method, to explain the variation in effectiveness. Based on these mechanisms, three hypotheses are put forth: rhetoric is the most effective method for changing trade preferences among individuals in the same party as the communicating political leader, sharing academic research or expert opinions is most effective in altering trade preferences among individuals in the opposite party and the overall public, and social media is the least effective method within the same party and overall. To test these hypotheses, a priming experiment is designed involving voting-age respondents in the United States who are exposed to relevant trade communications through one of the aforementioned methods. A difference of means test is then employed to
identify variations compared to the untreated control respondents.