By Leonardo Gonzalez

Abstract: This research explores the underlying domestic factors influencing autocratic regimes’ decisions to initiate conflict over territorial disputes. Specifically, the study investigates why some autocracies escalate territorial disputes into military conflicts while others refrain, despite similar external conditions. The central hypothesis posits that the level of threat posed by opposition groups, conceptualized as their unity and strategic coherence, significantly affects these decisions. Employing a logistic regression model on data from territorial disputes between 1947 and 2000, this paper introduces the novel variable “opposition level of threat,” operationalized through the coordination level of opposition strategies. This study challenges conventional perspectives that focus primarily on external triggers and regime type, arguing instead that internal political dynamics play a crucial role in autocratic decision-making processes. The findings suggest that autocratic regimes are more likely to pursue militarized conflict as a diversionary tactic when facing a highly unified and threatening opposition. This research contributes to the international relations literature by highlighting the impact of domestic political threats on autocratic foreign policy decisions and provides actionable insights for policymakers engaged in diplomacy and conflict resolution with autocratic states.